The Cash Nexus by Schneider, Carl E.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2007
The Cash Nexus
Carl E. Schneider
University of Michigan Law School, carlschn@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1975
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schneider, Carl E. "The Cash Nexus." Hastings Center Rep. 37, no. 4 (2007): 11-2.
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Tue, 20 Jun 2017 18:38:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
at lavv 
The Cash Nexus 
by Carl E. Schneider 
If you attempt to shave too closely in 
money matters--grabbing when a patient 
... [is] so low that it is no longer decent to 
take fees; or hungrily holding watches, jew-
elry, or other articles as security for pay-
ment of your fees; or compelling their 
wounded or half-dead owners to pawn or 
sell them for your benefit; or [being} . . . 
too vigorous in your efforts to collect fees 
from persons in na"ow circumstances-
[this] would not only be brutal barbarity, 
but would be very apt to ... create a wide-
spread community feeling of hostility 
against you . ... It is almost better to be de-
frauded than to collect your fees by such 
method ... 
-Daniel Webster Cathell 
The Physician Himself 
Courts and legislatures have la-bored for decades to protect pa-
tients' choice of medical treat-
ments, even though patients seize that 
gift less eagerly than lawmakers expect. 
Yet while courts have rushed to build 
the whited sepulchre of informed con-
sent, they have fled from a related prob-
lem that patients actually yearn to solve 
and that actually can be ameliorated-
the plight of patients who perforce agree 
to a treatment before they know its costs 
and who receive a bill both unrelated to 
the treatment's value and several times 
what an insured patient would pay. 
Increasingly, patients must be con-
sumers in the medical marketplace. This 
frightens patients, and should. Medical 
bills can be as alarming and baffling as 
medical ailments. The costs of illness-
particularly medical bills--contribute to 
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more than half the personal bankrupt-
cies in the United States. Even insured 
patients may find themselves paying for 
uncovered services that can be both nu-
merous and dear. Furthermore, man-
aged care's effort to subdue health costs 
by inducing doctors to save money has 
been badly battered, and the new cry is 
to give patients such inducements in-
stead. "Consumer-directed health care" 
makes patients consumers by asking 
them to purchase insurance programs 
shrewdly and by using high deductibles 
(one to five thousand dollars) and health 
savings accounts to make them purchase 
specific treatments. In short, individual-
ly we must increasingly worry about 
buying care wisely, and nationally we 
must worry about our latest adventure 
in financing health care. 
So why should courts protect pa-
tients as consumers? You, dear con-
sumer, should protect yourself (caveat 
emptor) by evaluating what you buy, 
and the market should protect you by 
disciplining vendors who compete for 
your business. Evangelists of consumer-
directed health care fondly imagine just 
such a market. 
Really? You arrive at the doctor's of-
fice or the hospital and are told to sign a 
contract. Like this: 
In consideration of hospital services 
rendered to the patient, I jointly or 
severally, do hereby agree to pay 
Athens Regional Medical Center 
any and every account presented to 
me, or us jointly or severally, for 
said service or services in accor-
dance with the rates and terms of 
the hospital. 1 
In other words, "Do you want help? 
Sign a blank check. We'll fill it in later. 
As we wish." You do want help, so you 
sign. (And even if you don't, accepting 
services binds you to pay for them.) 
Consumer! You must shop for capa-
ble care at palatable prices. True, doctors 
don't advertise prices. So you telephone: 
''I'm a good consumer trying to direct 
my health care. How expensive is Dr. 
Jones?" Even if a human being answers, 
even if the human being thinks this 
question tolerable, what answer can you 
fairly expect? Do you know how long 
your visit will be? What services you will 
need? Which of the myriad insurance 
policies you have? If you don't know-
and who does?-what doctor's staff can 
predict the charges? (And finding out 
fees is a dream compared to ascertaining 
the quality of the doctor's work.) 
Or you ask the clerk about the hospi-
tal's prices. The clerk has no idea and re-
sents your impudence. You press up the 
ladder. Still no idea, still more resent-
ment. After you are discharged, you re-
ceive an ingeniously indecipherable bill 
that no one will explain. Eventually, you 
discover that bills are 
determined according to the hospi-
tal's "Charge Master," a confidential 
list of charges made by the hospital 
for all its goods and services, which 
is used to compute charges for all 
private commercial patients who are 
treated on a fee-for-service basis. 
The Charge Master is compiled and 
maintained by the hospital's chief 
financial officer on the hospital's 
computer system. In 1991, the 
Charge Master contained approxi-
mately 295 pages and listed prices 
for approximately 7,650 items [and 
today it would usually be several 
times that number]. The Charge 
Master is considered confidential 
proprietary information and is not 
shown to anyone other than the of-
ficers and employees of the hospital 
and authorized consultants. The 
Charge Master is adjusted on a 
weekly basis to reflect current cost 
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data; the hospital's costs are marked 
up by a mathematical formula de-
signed to produce a targeted 
amount of profit for the hospital.2 
Now another diablerie. Because your 
insurance doesn't cover your treatment, 
the hospital is charging two to four 
times what it would pay an insurer for 
what you received. The Wall Street jour-
nal described a patient treated two days 
for a suspected heart attack, for whom 
the "bill for the hospital stay totaled 
$29,500. That bill did not include an 
additional $6,800 from the cardiologist, 
$1,000 for the ambulance ride, and 
$7,500" for a stent. Had the patient 
"been poor enough to qualifY for state-
sponsored healthcare through Medicaid, 
the hospital would have accepted a pay-
ment of only $6,000 for the twenty-one 
hour hospital stay, $1,000 for the cardi-
ologist, and $165 for the ambulance 
ride." 
Of course, consumer, you should 
have shopped better and taken your 
business elsewhere. But how? First, your 
hospital is typical; its infuriating prac-
tices are partly responses to incentives in 
the health care system. Second, what 
other suitable hospitals were available? 
Third, you "chose" this hospital because 
your doctor sent you there, and you 
don't want to leave your doctor, since 
you know and trust your doctor and 
your doctor knows you. (In other 
words, you've just discovered that med-
ical institutions can have something like 
monopoly power, even though they may 
not be literal monopolies.) 
The hospital is now your creditor. 
The law (as it must) offers creditors 
multiple ways to wrest money from 
debtors, and hospitals have wielded 
these tools impressively. So, the hospital 
sues you to enforce its contract. 
Can't you defend yourself by saying 
that the hospital's charges are unfair? 
This is where courts are so complaisant. 
True, they won't enforce "uncon-
scionable" contracts. True, courts have 
other doctrines for moderating harsh 
contracts. But courts dislike amending 
contracts. First, contract law assumes 
people can bargain for themselves and 
know better than courts what they need. 
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Second, courts typically doubt their 
competence to evaluate the fairness of 
contractual exchanges. Third, if courts 
often altered contracts, contracts would 
lose much of their predictability and 
hence much of their value. 
So the court says that your contract 
"unambiguously creates an obligation 
for appellants to pay ARMC for hospital 
services 'in accordance with the rates 
and terms of the hospital."' The "plain 
language of the contract leaves the dis-
cretion to set the rates solely with" the 
hospital. The hospital exercised its dis-
cretion. Tough. What's more, your state 
requires hospitals to summarize a few of 
their charges on request. "Therefore," 
the state's policy "is that purchasers of 
hospital services use this pricing infor-
mation to compare hospital charges and 
make cost effective decisions. This rep-
resents the ... [legislature's] decision to 
let market forces control health care 
"3 costs ... 
But isn't this a "contract of adhe-
sion," a contract "which, imposed and 
drafted by the party of superior bargain-
ing strength, relegates to the subscribing 
party only the opportunity to adhere to 
the contract or reject it"? Alas, another 
uphill battle. One mother signed a con-
tract where the hospital "told me to sign, 
so they would give [my son] medical 
treatment because he needed it because 
he was bleeding out of his ears, out of 
his mouth, the bone out of his elbow 
was sticking out through the skin." The 
court managed to restrain its sympathy: 
One can gather she was hurried and 
under stress. She did not take the 
time to read the contract. That was 
no fault of the hospital. There was 
no duress; there was no fraud prac-
ticed upon Mrs. Chamberlin. The 
hospital ... could withhold its ser-
vices unless and until Mrs. Cham-
berlin signed the agreement. It is 
useless to speculate whether it 
would have done so, just as it is use-
less to speculate whether Mrs. 
Chamberlin would have signed the 
agreement, knowing she was oblig-
ating herself to pay the hospital bill, 
if the hospital had withheld its ser-
vices to her son until she had so 
done.4 
But come closer, Starbuck; thou re-
quirest a little lower layer. No doubt 
your hospital treats patients the way an 
airline treats passengers, but like the air-
line it isn't making monopoly profits; it's 
squeezed by rising costs, thrifty govern-
ments, and hard-bargaining insurers. To 
compensate for the good rates insurers 
win for their patients, uninsured pa-
tients are charged (but don't necessarily 
pay) dreadful rates. Courts may achieve 
Dickensian levels of heartlessness ("And 
the Union workhouses?" demanded 
Scrooge. "Are they still in operation?"), 
but judicially regulating the health care 
market intelligently and effectively will 
require subduing a Nemean lion. 
Nevertheless, it should (in the stan-
dard judicial phrase) shock the con-
science of the court when a hospital tells 
the sick and dying, if you want our help 
(and good luck finding anybody else's), 
hand us your wallet, and you'll get back 
what we choose to give; then submits 
inexplicable and unexplained bills unre-
lated to any objective value of its ser-
vices; and finally hustles the debtor off 
to bankruptcy. Courts have doctrines 
they can develop to curb egregious abus-
es of the law of contract, and they 
should use them. But meanwhile, pay 
up. And look forward to consumer-
directed health care. 
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